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NOTES
ETHICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FAIR DEALING:
A PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
NONEVIDENTIARY INFORMATION
David Aaron*
The difference between the true lawyer and those men who con-
sider the law merely a trade is that the latter seek to find ways to...
violate the moral standards of society without overstepping the let-
ter of the law, while the former look for principles .. within the
limits of the spirit of the law in common moral standards.
INTRODUCTION
Legal and ethical codes maintain a general standard of professional
conduct among attorneys. For example, law and ethics prohibit law-
yers from making false statements of material fact,2 communicating
with individuals represented by counsel,3 and offering false evidence4
while representing their clients. Existing rules, however, leave gray
areas of ungoverned conduct. This lack of regulation requires attor-
neys to consider their own morality as well as their desire to compete
with their peers when confronted with a variety of dilemmas.
The following hypothetical examples illustrate the shortcomings of
contemporary codes. In one instance, a prosecutor has indicted a de-
fendant for a homicide. Describing the strength of her case, the pros-
ecutor informs the defense attorney that in addition to circumstantial
evidence, the government has located a reliable eyewitness to the
crime. She offers a plea agreement to a reduced charge and a shorter
sentence. Later in the week, the prosecutor is unable to contact the
eyewitness. Upon investigation, she learns that he has died,5 signifi-
cantly diminishing the strength of her case. The defense attorney in-
forms the prosecutor that the defendant has decided to accept the plea
offer and avoid the risk of a conviction at trial and a longer sentence.
The prosecutor must consider whether to inform the defendant that
the eyewitness is unavailable.6
* The author thanks his family and Professor Bruce A. Green for their support
and assistance in writing this Note.
1. Piero Calamandrei, Eulogy of Judges 62 (1942).
2. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1(a) (1998).
3. See id. Rule 4.2.
4. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).
5. Alternatively, the witness might have become unavailable or unwilling to
testify.
6. In 1994, a Deputy County Attorney ("DCA") presented a similar question to
the Arizona Bar Association. See Arizona State Bar Ethics Opinion 94-07, at 1 (Mar.
18, 1994). The arresting officer in a case died shortly after testifying at a preliminary
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In another case, a defendant is preparing to testify after the prose-
cution has rested. She is ready to offer the same alibi she presented to
the prosecutor during pretrial conferences. The prosecutor's parale-
gal enters and quietly informs the prosecutor that the defendant's alibi
witness has disappeared, or that a witness who could rebut the defend-
ant's alibi testimony has surfaced.7 Similarly, a defendant's prospec-
tive alibi witness might confess to the prosecutor that he or she had
agreed to lie for the defendant, but has decided to tell the truth when
called to testify. The prosecutor must determine what, if any, infor-
mation to disclose to the defendant.
None of the above is discoverable material. The death of a witness
does not constitute evidence.8 Even if a witness's death were evi-
dence, it would not amount to exculpatory evidence, as it would not
be "material either to guilt or to punishment."9 Similarly, allowing a
defendant to develop a trial strategy based upon an incorrect assump-
tion that the circumstances of a case have not changed will only be
considered an ethical violation if the prosecutor affirmatively created
the misconception."0 Furthermore, in contrast to disclosure of excul-
patory evidence, disclosure of any of the above information would not
prevent a factually inaccurate conviction from occurring."1 Knowl-
edge of the eyewitness's death or absence would allow the defendant
to escape punishment as a result of chance, and disclosing the alibi
witness information would only protect the defendant's ability to cal-
culate his or her perjury. Following this reasoning, courts have de-
hearing. See id. The DCA inquired as to his duty to inform the defendant of this
development, as the defendant was considering a plea offer the DCA made prior to
the officer's death. See id. The ethics panel determined that while Ethical Rule 3.8(d)
might mandate disclosure, strict disclosure requirements under state criminal proce-
dure law obviated the need to resolve the question of an ethical obligation. See id. at
6. The panel noted that the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure contain "especially
broad requirements for disclosure." Id. at 5. The ethical issues discussed in this Note
are implicated when applicable criminal procedure law does not mandate disclosure.
7. The witness is not in government custody in this hypothetical example.
8. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining "relevant evidence"); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985) (holding that evidence is material when there is a reasonable
probability that disclosure would have resulted in a different result at trial); People v.
Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1978) ("[T]he circumstance that the testimony of [a]
complaining witness [is] no longer available ... [is] not evidence at all.... Rather....
[it] would merely have been one of the factors ... to be weighed by defendant in
reaching his decision [to plead guilty.]").
9. Jones, 375 N.E.2d at 43 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
10. See People v. Rice, 505 N.E.2d 618, 619 (N.Y. 1987).
11. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Pro-
cess, 40 Hastings L.J. 957, 1026 (1989) (arguing that receipt of exculpatory evidence
by a defendant prior to his or her plea will reduce pressure for innocent defendant to
plead guilty).
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dined to extend the due process doctrine of Brady v. Maryland1 2 to
the disclosure of nonevidentiary facts.
Awareness of these facts, however, could determine a defendant's
future. A rational actor offered a choice will seek to maximize his or
her benefit based on all available information. In deciding whether to
plead guilty, thereby waiving the constitutional right to trial, 3 or
whether to testify, thereby waiving the constitutional right against
self-incrimination,' 4 a rational defendant assesses the risks and re-
wards accompanying either choice.'5 Although some facts may not
constitute evidence, their disclosure may nevertheless be essential to a
defendant's informed decision. In the interests of fair dealing and
consistency with existing professional standards, therefore, this Note
proposes an ethical duty requiring prosecutors to disclose noneviden-
tiary information that would allow a defendant to make an informed
tactical decision. Withholding such information exploits the prosecu-
tor's superior access to information, undermines the prosecutor's spe-
cial duty to do justice, and is inconsistent with the philosophy of
lawyers' professional ethics.
While the law is settled on this subject, prosecutors as well as de-
fense attorneys disagree as to whether professional ethics impose a
further duty upon prosecutors.16 Contemporary legal and ethical
rules do not adequately define a prosecutor's obligation to disclose
nonevidentiary information to his or her adversary. Prosecutorial
"bluffing" and other withholding tactics can therefore not be evalu-
ated against any universal standard; they occur within a "normative
no-man's land" ungoverned by posited rules. 7 The existence of this
ungoverned territory does not comport with the ideals of our legal and
ethical systems and indicates that further disclosure rules are neces-
sary to fill the gaps in existing regulation.
This Note examines the principles underlying existing legal and eth-
ical standards for pretrial and nonevidentiary disclosure. The general
ethical duty of candor sheds some light on the question of whether a
prosecutor should make such "strategic" as well as evidentiary disclo-
12. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused.., violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment .... "). For a discussion of Brady, see infra Part II.B.2.
13. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
14. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
15. See Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial Ad-
herence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 751, 769 (1985).
16. See Wflliam F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case Against
Plea-Bargaining, in Plea-Bargaining 1, 3-4 (William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer
eds., 1980) [hereinafter McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing]; Interviews with
Prosecutors "A" and "B." Counsel are referred to anonymously to allow unrestricted
answers.
17. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing, supra note 16, at 3. "[Tihe essence of
bluffing is to pretend that one is in a stronger position than one actually is." Id. at 3.
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sures. The law and ethics of negotiation in the civil context also pro-
vide some guideposts. The prosecutor's special duty to do justice,
however, as well as varying concepts of the role and purpose of nego-
tiated dispositions in criminal law, introduce unique considerations in
defining the ethical obligations governing prosecutors.
Part I of this Note analyzes lawyers' general ethical responsibilities,
explains current regulation of disclosure, and reviews criticism of dis-
closure requirements in the civil arena. This part examines the em-
phasis on good faith in civil law, which has generated rules and
proposals that can contribute to an understanding of fairness in crimi-
nal adjudication. Part II discusses the purpose of the criminal justice
system, which provides the framework within which ethical considera-
tions will operate, and distinguishes the prosecutor's role from the
role of other attorneys. This part traces the history of the principles
reflected in Brady v. Maryland,8 its precursors, and its progeny, and
analyzes the dual policy objectives underlying prosecutors' legal obli-
gations: fairness to defendants and effective law enforcement. This
part discusses prosecutors' special ethical responsibilities, which im-
pose duties beyond those mandated by constitutional jurisprudence
and rules of criminal procedure. The policy foundations of prosecu-
tors' special obligation to seek justice bolster arguments for mandat-
ing honorable conduct, while the need to implement criminal
sanctions counsels against overly broad requirements. Part III offers
arguments for and against further disclosure in the criminal context.
This Note concludes that a new ethical standard would add consis-
tency to existing standards of professional responsibility.
I. THE ROLE OF LEGAL ETHics
Ethical codes may extend attorneys' responsibilities beyond the re-
quirements imposed by constitutional and statutory obligations. This
part discusses the sources of legal ethics, as well as the substance of
current and proposed obligations, in order to define the purpose and
scope of an additional duty.
A. The Origins of Professional Ethics
Professional ethics may derive from fundamental morality: "It is
inherent in the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that
it is morally binding on the conscience of the professional, and not
merely a rule of the game adopted because other players observe (or
fail to adopt) the same rule." 9 In addition, lawyers owe a duty to one
another: "[I]t is the desire for the respect and confidence of the mem-
bers of his profession and of the society which he serves that should
18. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19. Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La. L. Rev.
577, 589 (1975) [hereinafter Rubin, Causerie].
3008 [Vol. 67
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provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of
ethical conduct.",20 Furthermore, the bar's legitimacy as a self-regulat-
ing and licensed profession relies upon its enforcement of a code of
moral and honorable conduct. Adherence to standards "higher than
mere law observance "21 is implicit in the concept of a licensed profes-
sion.22 The societal interest of a republic requires an independent bar;
self-regulation is essential to freedom from governmental control,
which in turn "preserv[es] government under law."'23 The grant of in-
dependence from external regulation imposes a duty to ensure that
attorneys act consistently with the public interest.24 Existing codes,
however, are deficient in their regulation of many strategic and tacti-
cal practices of attorneys in general and of prosecutors in particular.
B. Current Disclosure Obligations
As Professor Geoffery Hazard has observed, "[t]he present regula-
tion of lawyers' trustworthiness is modest., 25 Particularly in negotia-
tion, ethical standards of honesty are sparse. While current practice
condemns outright lying,2 6 "good faith negotiation does not require
total disclosure. '27 The American Bar Association recently rejected a
proposal requiring an attorney to correct misapprehensions of fact or
law arising from a previous representation by the attorney or the at-
torney's client.28
The Canons of Ethics, drafted in 1908, required attorneys to con-
duct themselves with candor and fairness in their dealings with judges
as well as other attorneys.29 The Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, however, omitted the requirement from its regulation of con-
duct among lawyers.30 The Model Code prohibits lawyers from
knowingly making false statements of law or fact,31 participating in the
20. Model Code of Professional Responsibility pmbl. (1980).
21. Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 593.
22. See id.
23. Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. (1998); see also The Federalist No.
78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed., 1987) (" '[T]here is no liberty if
the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.'
And . . .liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments ...." (citation
omitted)).
24. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl.
25. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy When
Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1981).
26. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
27. R. Fisher & W. Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving
in 140 (1981) (quoted in McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1023).
28. See McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1024 & n.200.
29. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 22 (1908).
30. See Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 579 (noting the absence of duty from
Model Code, specifically EC 7-38).
31. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(5).
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creation or preservation of evidence that they know is false,3" and
counseling or assisting their clients in fraudulent or illegal conduct.33
Beyond requiring attorneys to obey laws governing disclosure34 and
rectify frauds perpetrated by their clients upon persons or tribunals,35
however, the Model Code only proscribes false representation and
does not impose an affirmative duty to disclose information.36
The ABA specifically chose to omit a requirement of truth in nego-
tiations from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.37 The Model
Rules prohibit attorneys from making false statements of material law
or fact to third persons and require lawyers to disclose material facts
when necessary to avoid assisting their clients in committing a fraudu-
lent or criminal act.38 These limited disclosure obligations, however,
are subject to the rule of confidentiality,39 and the comment to Rule
4.1 limits the definition of statements of fact.4 ° The comment also
specifies that attorneys have no general affirmative disclosure obliga-
tion to opposing parties.4' In pretrial procedure, the Model Rules
simply require adherence to the laws of discovery.42 Furthermore, as
several commentators have noted, the Model Rules are drafted pri-
marily to regulate attorney conduct in litigation and do not translate
well into an extrajudicial context, resulting in a dearth of binding prin-
ciples governing fairness in negotiation.43
Members of the bar have not achieved a consensus regarding disclo-
sure requirements in civil negotiation.44 The ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, or Kutak Commission, pro-
posed rules governing the subject in 1981. 45 The proposed Rule 4.1
required in part that a lawyer disclose a fact under "circumstances [in
which] failure to make the disclosure is equivalent to making a mate-
32. See id. DR 7-102(A)(6).
33. See id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
34. See id. DR 7-102(A)(3).
35. See id. DR 7-102(B)(1). This obligation does not supersede attorney-client
privilege. See id.
36. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 189.
37. See Center for Prof'l Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, The Legislative His-
tory of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA
House of Delegates 145-47 (1987).
38. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1983).
39. See id.
40. See id. Rule 4.1 cmt. 2.
41. See id. Rule 4.1 cmt. 1.
42. See id. Rule 3.4.
43. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Is-
sues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 407, 409-10 (1997); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of
Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 529 (1989).
44. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 192; McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1024.
45. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 190-91.
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rial misrepresentation .... The Commission also discussed man-
dating that a lawyer "be fair in dealing with other participants"47 in
negotiation and that he or she disclose material facts, "even if adverse,
when disclosure is... [n]ecessary to correct a manifest misapprehen-
sion of fact or law resulting from a previous representation made by
the lawyer .... ,4 The Commission designed these proposals to en-
sure that a lawyer who acted as the instrument of a transaction would
also maintain the transaction's integrity.4 9 The bar, however, "vehe-
mently" opposed and rejected these proposals;50 lawyers objected to a
requirement that attorneys be "fair."'"
C. Critiques and Proposals
A proposal for disclosure requirements never passed because of the
"lack of a firm professional consensus regarding the standard of open-
ness that should govern lawyers' dealings with others ... " 5 Lawyers
do not share a uniform conception of fairness;5 3 in the absence of ethi-
cal regulation, therefore, each lawyer may decide questions of disclo-
sure differently. Moreover, attorneys' goals in negotiation do not
always include fairness. Practitioners often consider "misdirection" to
be a component of effective negotiation. 4 The pressure to zealously
advocate a client's position intensifies the pressure on an attorney to
lie to or misdirect another party.55 Typical justifications for engaging
in such misdirection "proceed from an initial but unspoken assump-
tion-that being less than truthful is acceptable conduct for a member
of the legal profession. 51 6 As many commentators have argued, the
failure of ethical regulation to impose a strong disincentive to such
dishonest behavior is inconsistent with societal and professional ex-
pectations of lawyer conduct.'
46. ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 4.1(b)(1) (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981), quoted in Haz-
ard, supra note 25, at 190.
47. ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 4.2(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), cited in McMunigal,
supra note 11, at 1024 & n.200.
48. Id. Rule 4.2(b).
49. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 192 (citation omitted).
50. See id.; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1998) (omitting pro-
posed obligation).
51. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 192.
52. Id. at 193.
53. See id.
54. See Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 La. L
Rev 447, 457 (1995) [hereinafter Rubin, Ethics of Negotiations].
55. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L Rev.
1219, 1272 (1990).
56. Rubin, Ethics of Negotiations, supra note 54, at 458.
57. See, eg., Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 584 ("None would apparently deny
that honesty and good faith in the sale of a house or a security implies telling the truth
1999] 3011
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Proposals for regulating attorney conduct in civil negotiation are
relevant to criminal procedure; similar to plea bargaining, negotiation
and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") have become routine
means of case disposition58 while remaining less regulated than litiga-
tion practice. Commentators' proposals proceed from the proposition
that fairness and honesty are essential both to lawyers' professional
honor as well as to efficient and equitable results.59 As discussed be-
low, applying these principles to the criminal context would arguably
promote fairness to defendants and the pursuit of justice.60
While ADR's proponents shared common goals and values during
the practice's nascent period, the growing quantity and diversity of
ADR practitioners and their policies raise a need for ethical regula-
tion to preserve fairness and justice in the practice.6 Legitimacy and
public confidence depend upon the regulation of informal case resolu-
tion practices by ethical standards that extend further than those re-
quiring candor in formal court settings.62
The proposed Rule 4.1, which the ABA narrowed, and Rule 4.2,
which the Kutak Commission ultimately rejected,63 represent the most
formal efforts to bolster ethical standards of fair dealing. Proceeding
from the premise that lawyers' societal function is to achieve the "just
termination of disputes, ' 64 some commentators propose similar stan-
dards: "The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith '6 and "may
not accept a result that is unconscionably unfair to the other party. ,,66
Recalling the simple language of Canon 22,67 these standards impose
duties to society and to the legal profession rather than to clients.6
Other scholars offer practical guidance: attorneys should not make
misleading statements or remain silent regarding misstatements that
create incorrect impressions in their dealings with other parties if their
conduct would differ in the presence of a judge.69
Until the legal profession adopts such a principle, however, the de-
fault rules of contract law govern lawyers' negotiations. Plea bargain-
ing shares some characteristics of contract and settlement negotiation,
and courts treat plea agreements as similar to contracts in some re-
and not withholding information. But the Code does not exact that sort of integrity
from lawyers . . ").
58. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43, at 408.
59. See id. at 448-49; Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 589.
60. See infra Part III.A.3.
61. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43, at 448-49.
62. See id. at 419.
63. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
64. Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 589.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 591.
67. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
68. See Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 592.
69. See Rubin, Ethics of Negotiations, supra note 54, at 476.
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spects.7° The regulation of civil contract negotiation and ADR may
therefore provide guidance in developing ethical rules for plea bar-
gaining. The next section briefly discusses disclosure obligations in
contract negotiations.
D. Duties Under Contract Law
The classical view of contract law held that a party could not avoid
honoring a transaction as a result of the other party's nondisclosure of
material information when the complaining party could have discov-
ered the information through investigation. In Laidlaw v. Organ,71
the Supreme Court, emphasizing the doctrine of caveat emptor, ruled
that a buyer's failure to inform a seller of the end of the War of 1812,
which increased the market value of the seller's goods, did not allow
the seller to void the transaction.72 Noting that "the sphere of moral-
ity is more extensive than the limits of civil jurisdiction,"' 3 the Court
held that parties have no disclosure obligation to each other "where
the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both .... ."I
Cicero anticipated a similar dilemma in the first century B.C.E.,
positing a grain merchant who traveled to a town suffering from fam-
ine.75 The merchant knew that other grain sellers would arrive soon,
and Cicero asked whether the merchant should inform the townspe-
ople, thereby lowering the price they would pay for his grain, or re-
main silent.7 6 Cicero decided the merchant should fully disclose to the
town:
Holding things back does not always amount to concealment; but
it does when you want people, for your own profit, to be kept in the
dark about something which you know and would be useful for
them to know .... [T]he sort of person who practises [sic] [this kind
of concealment] ... is the reverse of open, straightforward, fair, and
honest: he is a shifty, dee, artful, treacherous, malevolent, under-
hand, sly, habitual rogue."
Informed consent requires, at minimum, equal access to information
by the parties to a bargain. Honest negotiators will not exploit knowl-
edge that others could not discover, and a bargain premised upon such
exploitation will not generally be enforceable. Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Laidlaw emphasized that a reasonable investigation
70. See Santobelo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); infra Part .A.3.
71. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
72. See id. at 193.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
75. See Cicero, On Duties III, in Selected Works 157, 177 (Michael Grant trans.,
Penguin Books 1971) (44 B.C.E.).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 180.
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would have revealed the signing of the Treaty of Ghent;78 the parties
had comparable access to the information in question.79
The modern view, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, provides for relief when a party's nondisclosure transgresses
standards of good faith and fair dealing.80 Fairness requires disclosure
of a fact that would affect the other party's decisions and to which the
other party does not have access.81 Disclosure obligations therefore
acquire significance when two parties with unequal access to informa-
tion enter into an agreement that relies on informed consent for its
legitimacy.
Obligations in civil negotiation, however, developed within the par-
adigm of parity between the parties' negotiating power. In contrast,
bargaining in the criminal context only occurs after the state has ex-
erted its coercive power over the defendant, and the defendant is not
at liberty to simply walk away from the negotiation. Furthermore, un-
like civil negotiation, the criminal justice system is not intended to
maximize each party's benefit, and implicates concerns alien to con-
tract law. Part II discusses the unique context of criminal law and its
implications for disclosure obligations.
II. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Prosecutors' unique mandate to seek justice, rather than simply to
advocate their cases,8" adds ethical restraints upon their behavior.8 3
This part begins by discussing the unique interests of the criminal jus-
tice system, then examines the legal disclosure obligations and special
ethical considerations prosecutors bear. This part further suggests
that while the rules and ethics of civil negotiation and discovery may
not be transferable to the criminal arena in their entirety, the value of
fair bargaining, which informs current obligations and permeates pro-
posals for further regulation, should generate an ethical obligation for
prosecutors to act honorably in influencing defendants' tactical deci-
sions. The goal of fairness should appeal to prosecutors' special duty
to seek justice, but cannot crowd out the other goals of the criminal
justice system.
78. Treaty of Peace and Amity, Dec. 24, 1814 (U.S.-U.K.), 8 Stat. 218 (ending the
War of 1812).
79. See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 195.
80. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b) (1981).
81. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 106 (5th
ed. 1984).
82. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103, EC 7-13 (1980);
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1998); Standards Relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(c) (1992).
83. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham
L. Rev. 2117, 2131 (1998) ("Because the prosecutor is, in principle, looking for a 'fair'
price rather than the highest price, arguments couched in terms of justice will have
more currency than they might in a purely economic negotiation.").
[Vol. 673014
1999] NONEVIDENTIARY INFORMATION 3015
A. The Interests of Criminal Procedure Law
American criminal procedure law has historically balanced the val-
ues of personal autonomy and dignity against the need to effectively
enforce substantive criminal laws.' Criminal adjudication, in contrast
to civil litigation, does not resolve disputes between private parties; it
punishes offenders and deters future misconduct.' Furthermore, the
criminal justice system is not a purely adversarial process. Unlike a
civil case, a criminal prosecution does not simply match one zealous
advocate against another. The prosecutor represents society, and con-
sequently is responsible for protecting the due process rights of every
individual, including the defendant, as well as for securing accurate
convictions.86 The government must deter and punish criminal activ-
ity, but is bound to do so consistently with statutory requirements and
the limits of due process of law. 7
84. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 153, 165 (1968). Mis-
sissippi, for example, has defined the interests served by its criminal justice system as
follows:
(1)(a) The prosecutorial interest, including the prompt detection and in-
vestigation of offenses and the speedy and vigorous apprehension and prose-
cution and punishment of offenders;
(b) The victim's interest, including respect for the personal tragedy...
suffered by the victims of offenders;
(c) The defense interest, including respect for the presumption of inno-
cence of persons accused of offenses and those whose liberty interests are at
risk, guaranteeing to each accused person the effective assistance of compe-
tent, loyal and independent counsel, and assuring that each such person is
prosecuted and punished only as may be found consistent with due process
of law;
(d) The state's justice interest, which includes administration of its crimi-
nal justice system, so as to secure the just, fair, speedy, and efficient adjust-
ment and final adjudication of each charge formally made, to protect the
innocent, and to punish offenders;
(e) The state's prevention and deterrence interests, which include reduc-
ing the number and degree of offenses as much as is reasonably practicable
Mississippi Statewide Public Defender System Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-33
(1998).
85. See infra notes 88, 89 and accompanying text.
86. See Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice 3-1.2(b)-(c)
(1992).
87. The Framers of the Constitution recognized that a government must wield suf-
ficient coercive power to enforce its laws. See The Federalist, supra note 23, No. 15, at
149 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with
a sanction .... If there be no penalty... the resolutions or commands which pretend
to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.").
Alexander Hamilton observed that one purpose of the state is to effectively imple-
ment just laws: "Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of
men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint." Id. In
creating the United States government, the Framers criticized the Articles of Confed-
eration for entrusting the government with inadequate enforcement power. See, e.g.,
Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 1, 1786), reprinted in 2 Great Issues
in American History 82, 82 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958) ("We have errors to cor-
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One purpose of American criminal procedure is therefore to ad-
vance the goals of substantive criminal law. This includes obtaining
convictions of criminal offenders through the discovery of empirical
facts, or "truth-seeking," combined with a finding of moral culpabil-
ity.8" Criminal procedure must also promote the goals of punishment,
which may include retribution against an offender, deterrence against
the offender's recidivism or against commission of similar acts by
others, isolating a dangerous individual from society, or rehabilitating
an offender. 89
The criminal justice system combines the necessities of detection,
conviction, and punishment of offenders with respect for individual
autonomy and dignity.90 Due process jurisprudence therefore restricts
the government's ability to investigate crimes and convict offenders in
order to preserve civil liberties. 91 Some limitations promote the accu-
racy of convictions by compelling the government to prove its case
fairly. 2 The government bears a general duty to step out of the ad-
versarial context to avoid convicting an innocent defendant. 93 For ex-
rect. We have probably had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our
confederation. Experience has taught us, that men will not adopt and carry into exe-
cution measures the best calculated for their own good, without the intervention of a
coercive power."); see also The Federalist, supra note 23, No. 21, at 173 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("The next most palpable defect of the existing Confederation is the total
want of a SANCTION to its laws."). The survival of the Republic required a govern-
ment with the authority to use coercion to implement its directives.
88. See N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05(1), (3) (McKinney 1998) (identifying purposes of
criminal law as prohibiting conduct that unjustifiably harms or threatens individual or
public interests and defining the acts and requisite mens rea which constitute of-
fenses); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 197-98 (1983) (discussing
moral as well as factual evaluation of criminal defendants' conduct).
89. See N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05(5), (6) (defining purposes of providing for victim
and community response when appropriate, and of deterrence, rehabilitation, and
confinement); Arenella, supra note 88, at 198-99; Leon Pearl, A Case Against the
Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment. A Response to Professor Pugsley, 11
Hofstra L. Rev. 273, 274, 288-89 (1982) (describing the moral justification of punish-
ment in retributivist theories); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L.J. 315, 334,
337-38 (1984) [hereinafter Seidman, Utilitarian Theory] (discussing the utilitarian
goals of deterring crime by imposing costs of criminal acts that outweigh their benefits
to individual offenders and of minimizing the total cost of crime and crime
prevention).
90. See infra notes 98-108, 151-58 and accompanying text.
91. See infra Part II.B.2.
92. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (requiring disclosure of
exculpatory evidence); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (entitling
defendants to copies of prosecution witnesses' prior written or recorded statements).
93. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing prosecutors'
"twofold aim... that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer"); Robert M. Ireland,
Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39
Am. J. Legal Hist. 43, 53-54 (1995) (describing criticism of private prosecutors' ac-
ceptance of "'blood money' in return for a pledge to seek a conviction no matter what
the evidence proved" and arguments that a private prosecutor is "inspired by his fee
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ample, constitutional law prohibits the government from introducing
the identification testimony of a witness who has been exposed to an
unduly suggestive out-of-court identification procedure.94 Due pro-
cess further requires that a defendant have access to representation by
competent counsel, 95 prior statements of government witnesses,96 and
potentially exculpatory evidence 97 in order to prevent the govern-
ment's use of its superior power to obtain an inaccurate conviction.
While promoting accurate enforcement of the criminal law is one
goal of procedural due process, "the fairness of the state-individual
interaction in the criminal process cannot be defined solely in terms of
procedures that contribute to good substantive criminal law results."' g
Criminal procedure law must implement substantive law in a manner
that legitimizes the government's monopoly of the use of coercive
force.99 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments, for example, introduce
concerns independent of the accuracy of results. The Fourth Amend-
ment protects areas of privacy into which the government may not
unreasonably intrude."c The Fifth Amendment promotes individual
dignity and autonomy,10 1 reflecting a "respect for the inviolability of
the human personality"102 that distinguishes the American criminal
justice system from the inquisitorial methods of the Star Chamber. 3
Criminal procedure law protects these rights against government
and not by a pursuit of justice"); Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 735, 736-37 (1995).
94. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
95. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that defendants
charged with serious crimes are entitled to representation provided by the state).
96. See Jencks, 353 U.S. at 668-69 (holding that the confrontation clause requires
disclosure of prosecution witnesses' prior written or recorded statements to facilitate
cross-examination regarding inconsistencies).
97. See infra Part II.B.2.
98. Arenella, supra note 88, at 202; see Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Im-
proving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 Cornell L Rev. 1, 51 (1974)
("[I]n legal ordering, man does not live by results alone.").
99. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Brandeis observed:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously.... Crime is contagious. If the Gov-
ernment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law .... To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
ld. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (enforcing Fourth
Amendment protection of the home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53
(1967) (protecting the privacy of oral communications); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (applying protection to physical privacy and dignity).
101. See William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Therapeutic
Confessions, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 951, 996 (1996).
102. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
103. See Nelson, supra note 101, at 996.
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transgression, sometimes forfeiting the search for truth in the
process. °4
An individual criminal adjudication thus combines a particularized
fact-finding with a "proxy battle[ ] over issues of social policy."' 10 5 The
goals of law enforcement and protecting civil liberties coexist in crimi-
nal procedure. 10 6 Criminal procedure law implements the coercive
power of the government while also regulating the state's exercise of
force. Prosecutors' double mandate of enforcing criminal laws and
seeking justice promotes both interests of the criminal justice sys-
tem.10 7 As agents of government and society, prosecutors must "ac-
commodate the tensions between the protection of individual rights
and the state's need to detect and punish criminal activity . . . .,18
B. Prosecutors' Legal Disclosure Obligations
Prosecutors are subject to constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
duties beyond those governing the legal profession in general as a re-
sult of their dual role. Criminal disclosure regulation reflects the di-
chotomy of interests within criminal procedure law. Although
criminal procedure law does not require extensive disclosure, the phi-
losophy underlying current regulation emphasizes fairness to all de-
fendants. The narrow scope of existing requirements, however,
reflects a policy judgment favoring restricting criminal defendants' dis-
covery rights further than those of civil litigants. While current disclo-
sure duties reflect a concern for defendants' rights, they also account
for the need for an effective criminal justice system; any proposal for a
new requirement, then, must satisfy these dual objectives.
1. Statutory and Regulatory Obligations
While constitutional jurisprudence defines several discovery rights
of defendants, legislation and rules require additional disclosure by
prosecutors. 0 9 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Criminal
Rules") establish a minimum standard of disclosure that courts may
increase during trial at their discretion."0 The limited discovery re-
104. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
105. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination
of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 442 (1980)
[hereinafter Seidman, Continuity and Change].
106. See Packer, supra note 84, at 153.
107. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) ("[Tjhe prosecutor's
role transcends that of an adversary: he 'is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty.., whose interest.., in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
108. Arenella, supra note 88, at 187.
109. See Frank W. Miller et al., Criminal Justice Administration: Cases and Materi-
als 780 (4th ed. 1991).
110. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234-36
(1975) (holding that Rule 16 does not control a court's judgment at trial, and that the
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quirements of criminal procedure statutes reflect a policy judgment
against affording criminal defendants the broad access to information
to which parties in civil litigation are entitled."'
The Criminal Rules require an indictment to present a "plain, con-
cise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged.""' 2 Defendants may request a bill of particulars
to amplify the elements alleged in an indictment." 3 Defendants may
not use the bill to investigate or discover evidence the government
might use to prove its case; clarifications are generally confined to ba-
sic facts such as the date, time, and place of the alleged crime, the
identity of the alleged victim, and the general manner in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed." 4 The Criminal Rules also
require the government to provide the defendant with copies of any
written or recorded statements he or she made to law enforcement
officers, his or her testimony in grand jury and pretrial proceedings,"'
and his or her criminal record." 6 Further, prosecutors must give the
defendant an opportunity to copy or inspect documents," 7 tangible
objects," 8 and test reports" 9 that the government intends to intro-
duce in its case-in-chief. These obligations continue as the prosecutor
obtains additional discoverable material. 2 The defendant is also en-
titled to Jencks Act material, which consists of copies of any state-
ments made by government witnesses, but only after each wvitness's
direct examination.' 2 ' The Criminal Rules allow a defendant to re-
quest notice of the government's intent to use material that is discov-
Jencks Act limitation on a trial court's discretion did not convert Rule 16 into a gen-
eral limitation on the court's decision-making authority at trial).
111. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
112. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).
113. See id. Rule 7(f). A bill of particulars specifies "the nature of the charge pend-
ing against [the defendant], thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to pre-
vent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a
second time for the same offense." United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572,574 (2d
Cir. 1987).
114. See United States v. Villanueva, No. 91 Cr. 976, 1992 WL 77573, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1992); United States v. Guerrerio, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1224
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The test is not whether the particulars sought would be usefid to
the defense. Rather, a more appropriate inquiry is whether the information in ques-
tion is necessary to the defense."); Harry I. Subin et al., The Criminal Process: Prose-
cution and Defense Functions § 14.3(a)(2), at 217 (1993).
115. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
116. See id. Rule 16(a)(1)(B).
117. See id. Rule 16(a)(1)(C).
118. See id.
119. See id. Rule 16(a)(1)(D).
120. See id. Rule 16(c).
121. See id. Rule 26.2(a). The term "Jencks Act" material is derived from the deci-
sion in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (entitling defendants to
copies of prosecution witnesses' prior written or recorded statements). Prosecutors
may, and often do, provide witness statements prior to trial according to the policies
of their offices and individual judges. See Subin et al., supra note 114, § 14.5(a)(3), at
221.
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erable under Rule 16122 to facilitate a pretrial motion to suppress. 123
The Criminal Rules do not mandate disclosure of government wit-
nesses' identities or statements other than Jencks Act material. 24
State rules governing criminal procedure may enhance prosecutors'
disclosure obligations. New York, for example, requires prosecutors
to notify defendants of the People's intent to offer testimony of a wit-
ness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. 125
The Criminal Rules require significantly less pretrial discovery than
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Civil Rules"). 26 The criminal
and civil rules both emphasize efficiency. Whereas the Civil Rules are
drafted upon the premise that "litigation should be based on open
access to all relevant information,"127 criminal procedure law restricts
discovery to protect prosecution witnesses and limit witness tamper-
ing, subornation of perjury, and fabrication of evidence.' 28 The re-
duced requirements for prosecutorial disclosure also mitigate the
effect of the prosecutor's heavier burden of proof;-2 9 "it is not only the
defendant who is entitled to a fair trial. Society, too, represented by
122. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
123. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d).
124. See id. Rule 16(a)(2). Other obligations, such as Brady v. Maryland concerns,
may require further disclosure.
125. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.30(1)(b) (McKinney 1995).
126. See Subin et al., supra note 114, § 14.2, at 216. In general, the Civil Rules
entitle litigants to discovery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action ... including... any books, docu-
ments, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of any discoverable matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Parties to a civil matter
may obtain information through interrogatories, see id. Rule 33, demands for docu-
ment production, see id. Rule 34, and sworn depositions, see id. Rule 30. The court
must give advance approval only for physical or mental examinations of a party or
third person. See id. Rule 35; Richard L. Marcus et al., Civil Procedure: A Modern
Approach 326 (2d ed. 1995). The general exemptions from civil discovery are con-
fined to attorney-client privilege, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), attorney work product,
see id. Rule 26(b)(3), and a judge's exercise of discretion to protect a "party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," id. Rule
26(c).
127. Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations 325 (3d ed.
1997). The Civil Rules reflect the Advisory Committee's conclusion that exchange of
information is conducive to fairness in trials and settlements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. § V,
Depositions and Discovery, advisory committee's explanatory statement concerning
1970 Amendments to Discovery Rules. Unlike an indictment in a criminal action,
which a prosecutor generally seeks upon belief that there is sufficient evidence to
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, see Subin et al., supra note 114, § 14.1, at
214, the pleadings commencing a civil action present a skeletal case that discovery will
"flesh out." See Glannon, supra, at 301. Civil discovery rules are therefore designed
to give each side a full understanding of the case and mandate a greater scope of
information exchange than the criminal rules.
128. See, e.g., State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969) (rejecting defendant's
argument for greater discovery due to the possibility of increasing the defendant's
opportunity to produce perjured testimony, fabricate evidence, or bribe or intimidate
witnesses, and noting that broad disclosure would provide the defendant with an un-
fair advantage because the state could not compel discovery from the defendant).
129. See Subin et al., supra note 114, § 14.2, at 216.
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the prosecution, has an equal right to one. ' 130 These considerations
limit the disclosure to which criminal defendants are entitled prior to
trial.
2. Due Process Jurisprudence
In Mooney v. Holohan,13' the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
who knowingly used perjured testimony and suppressed impeachment
evidence violated the defendant's right to due process by deliberately
deceiving the court and jury.' 32 The Court rejected the California At-
torney General's argument that a prosecutor's acts only deny due pro-
cess when they deprive a defendant of the rights to receive notice of
charges and to have an opportunity to present evidence and be
heard.133 Finding that the knowing use of perjury and suppression of
impeachment testimony undermined the purpose of the criminal jus-
tice process, the Court emphasized that "safeguarding the liberty of
the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state[ ] em-
bodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of
our civil and political institutions."'" The Court broadly stated the
rule that the knowing use of perjured testimony and the suppression
of favorable evidence violated a defendant's constitutional rights in
Pyle v. Kansas.'35
In the 1950s, following Pyle and Mooney, the Third Circuit issued
several decisions holding that the suppression of evidence favorable to
a defendant constituted a deprivation of due process on its own.1m In
Napue v. Illinois,13 7 the Supreme Court similarly extended Mooney,
holding that the prosecution's failure to correct false evidence, even
when unsolicited, deprived the defendant of due process.
Building on this earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in
Brady v. Maryland 39 that regardless of good or bad faith, the prose-
cution's failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant upon re-
quest violates due process "where the evidence is material either to
130. Eads, 166 N.W.2d at 771.
131. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
132. See id. at 112-13.
133. See id at 112.
134. Id.
135. 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942).
136. See United States ex reL Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955);
United States ex reL Alneida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815,820 (3d Cir. 1952) ("The suppres-
sion of evidence favorable to [the defendant] was a denial of due process.").
137. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
138. See id. at 269. In response to a question on direct examination, a witness
whom the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) had promised lenience testified
that he had not been offered any consideration in return for his testimony. See id. at
265. The AUSA did not correct the witness's statement. See id. The Court held that
the government's knowing use of false testimony to obtain a "tainted conviction" of-
fended "any concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 269.
139. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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guilt or to punishment .... The Court agreed with the court of
appeals that suppression of any exculpatory evidence denies the fair-
ness guaranteed by the Due Process clause when requested by the
defendant.141 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, explained that
"[t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is... avoidance of an unfair
trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are con-
victed but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administra-
tion of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.' 142 The
Court sought to avoid casting the prosecutor "in the role of an archi-
tect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice,
even though, as in the present case, his action is not 'the result of
guile." 1 43 These "standards of justice" therefore apply not only to the
motivations underlying a prosecutor's actions or inactions, but also to
their consequences.
The Court refined its due process disclosure analysis in several cases
following Brady. In United States v. Agurs,14 the Court confirmed
that a prosecutor bears an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence in the absence of a specific request by the defendant.'45 In
Agurs and subsequent cases, 4 6 the Court also developed the material-
ity standard for the disclosure requirement. 147 In United States v. Bag-
ley,141 the Court discerned a uniform test for the materiality of
exculpatory evidence: evidence is material when "there is a reason-
able probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.' 1 49 Exculpa-
tory evidence includes information that could impeach the credibility
of a government witness. 150
While disclosure obligations under Brady primarily ensure that a
defendant receives a full opportunity to disprove his or her factual
guilt, constitutional criminal procedure requirements do not focus ex-
clusively upon promoting accurate convictions. Constitutional law in-
troduces concerns extraneous to individual fact-findings and
adjudications when a societal interest limits the government's exercise
of power. For example, the exclusionary rule, derived from Weeks v.
140. Id. at 87.
141. See id. at 86.
142. Id. at 87.
143. Id. at 88 (quoting Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961)).
144. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
145. See id. at 111-12.
146. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
147. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985) (discussing the evolu-
tion of the materiality standard).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 682.
150. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
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United States151 and Mapp v. Ohio,'52 imposes a deterrent against gov-
ernment misconduct and unreasonable invasion of civil rights. 153
While questions of reliability at least partially informed early prohibi-
tions against the government's use of involuntary confessions, Weeks,
Mapp, and other exclusionary rules punish the government regardless
of the effect of investigative misconduct upon the reliability of evi-
dence.'54 The Weeks and Mapp rules introduce factors extraneous to
an individual defendant's factual guilt or innocence into a criminal ad-
judication. The Mapp opinion cited concern for judicial integrity' 55
and a need to enforce restrictions upon government invasion of indi-
vidual privacy156 as support for the exclusion of the fruits of an im-
proper search. The exclusion of evidence seized during a warrantless
arrest of a defendant in the defendant's residence,"s for example, ele-
vates an individual's right to privacy and security of his or her home
above the fact-finding value of reliable evidence. The Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and due process jurisprudence reflect commitments
to fairness and dignity "even when they impair procedure's guilt-de-
termination function."' 58
Fairness is essential to the legitimacy of plea negotiations as well as
trials. The Supreme Court has recognized that plea bargaining is sus-
ceptible to abuses of power, and that regulating the practice could
protect its integrity and fairness.'59 A trial court may therefore only
accept a guilty plea if a defendant offers it voluntarily and inteli-
gently.' 60 Absent misrepresentation or improper conduct by the gov-
ernment, a defendant's mistaken evaluation of the strength of the
prosecution's case is insufficient to invalidate a plea agreement. 6'
Although the "voluntary and intelligent" standard is low,' 6 the Court
151. 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (excluding evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution from trial).
152. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state courts).
153. See Miller et al., supra note 109, at 17.
154. See id The practice of using criminal procedure to deter government miscon-
duct is most commonly associated with the Warren Court. See Arenella, supra note
88, at 189 ("The Warren Court acted as the system's moral conscience by articulating
the ideals that should regulate the conduct of criminal justice officials in investigating
criminal activity and adjudicating guilt."). The Burger Court, however, "continued to
sacrifice the truth in individual cases on the altar of broader social goals." Seidman,
Continuity and Change, supra note 105, at 446; see, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (applying Miranda rule to custodial interrogations occurring
outside police stations).
155. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960)).
156. See id at 660.
157. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980).
158. Arenella, supra note 88, at 202.
159. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970).
160. See id. at 748.
161. See id at 757.
162. See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1004, 1008-09 (1986) (noting that nearly all pleas could meet the stan-
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emphasized that plea bargaining "presuppose[s] fairness in securing
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor"' 63 in holding that
prosecutorial misconduct can invalidate a guilty plea.' 64 Some circuit
courts have therefore held that applying the "voluntary and intelli-
gent" standard to guilty pleas requires a prosecutor to disclose mate-
rial discoverable under Brady v. Maryland to defendants pleading
guilty.165
As noted earlier, 6 6 the New York Court of Appeals declined to
extend the Brady v. Maryland doctrine to suppression of non-exculpa-
tory and nonevidentiary material.' 67 The court found neither any case
law 168 nor any ethical standard'69 imposing such an affirmative duty in
the absence of a query by the defendant. The court construed the
prohibition against prosecutors knowingly making false representa-
tions during plea negotiations 70 as possibly extending to "misleading
silence when there is an affirmative duty of disclosure,' ' 17 1 but found
no guidance in ethical standards in determining when such an affirma-
tive duty exists.' 72 In refusing to find an ethical obligation for the
prosecutor to update the information based upon which a defendant
decides to plead guilty, the court noted that a "fundamental concern
of the criminal justice system, of course, is that an innocent defendant
shall not be convicted; not that a possibly guilty actor shall escape
conviction because the People are not able to establish his guilt.' ' 7 3
This statement, however, is not entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court's emphasis on fairness for its own sake: "[O]ur system of...
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."' 7 The value of
fairness in criminal justice as well as the necessity of fairness among
parties to plea bargaining 175 warrant additional measures to ensure
good faith dealing. The concept that prosecutors bear different re-
dard, as a plea would be "voluntary" unless it was the product of threatened or actual
physical harm, overbearing coercion, or the defendant's irrationality, and would be
"intelligent" as long as the defendant had the advice of counsel and demonstrated a
basic understanding of the consequences of the plea).
163. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
164. See id.
165. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v.
United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); White v. United States, 858 F.2d
416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985).
Discoverable information remains restricted to material exculpatory evidence. See
Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255.
166. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
167. See People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. 1978).
168. See id. at 43-44.
169. See id. at 44.
170. See Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function
Standard 4.1(c) (1971).
171. Jones, 375 N.E.2d at 44.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
175. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
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sponsibilities than private advocates is implicit throughout due pro-
cess jurisprudence. This difference is also reflected in prosecutors'
ethical duties, which are discussed below.
C. Special Ethical Duties of Prosecutors
"The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it
must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach."' 76 Ethical and legal
standards peculiar to prosecutors maintain the boundaries of the
State's exercise of power and the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Prosecutors, who "wield[ ] the most terrible instruments of gov-
ernment,"' 77 have historically incurred greater ethical duties than
other attorneys. The State's "interest ... in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... [Wihile
[a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones."'178 A prosecutor therefore bears the dual ethical duties of zeal-
ous advocacy and seeking justice.1 9 As representatives of the citizens
of a state or the nation, prosecutors are bound to guard the rights of
both the accused and society.'8 0
Ethical concerns extending beyond due process may require
prosecutorial disclosure of nonevidentiary material independent of
constitutional constraints. For example, in People v. Rice,'' the New
York Court of Appeals found that a prosecutor's dissembling aimed at
affecting a defendant's trial tactics did not warrant a per se rule of
reversal, but did constitute a serious ethical violation."s The prosecu-
tor in Rice had deliberately misled the defendant, who was charged
with murder, attempted murder, and robbery, into believing that one
of his victims was alive and available to testify.'13 The court declined
to reverse the conviction because of the overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's guilt and the defendant's failure to show prejudice as a
result of the prosecutor's deceit." Despite finding no reversible er-
ror and refusing to adopt a per se rule of reversal under such circum-
stances, however, the court found that the prosecutor had violated his
ethical duties both as an attorney in general' s and as a prosecutor in
176. People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854 (N.Y. 1956).
177. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring)
(quoting Felix Frankfurter, Letter, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1941).
178. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
179. See Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-
1.2(b), (c) (1992); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980); Canons
of Professional Ethics Canon 5 (1908).
180. See Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 214 (1990).
181. 505 N.E.2d 618 (N.Y. 1987).
182. See id at 619.
183. See id at 618-19.
184. See id. at 619.
185. See id (citing In re Padilla, 491 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 1985)); Model Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(3), (5); (B)(2) (1980).
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particular. 18 6 Similarly, the concurring opinion in Dick v. Scroggy187
noted that the prosecutor probably committed an ethical violation
when he represented the victim of a drunk driving accident in a civil
suit against the defendant, whom he had previously convicted in the
criminal case arising from the same incident. 188 The misconduct, how-
ever, did not present a constitutional violation warranting reversal of
the defendant's conviction.'89 Ethics therefore extend professional
obligations beyond the limits imposed by law; ethical rules may con-
demn a prosecutor's acts as "an unforgivable abuse of the public trust
in which the public's overriding interest in the fair operation of its
criminal justice system, an interest prosecutors are sworn to up-
hold,"' 9 ° independently of constitutional and statutory restraints.' 9'
All attorneys are required to exhibit candor in the course of the
legal process. 192 The duty of candor supersedes the duty of zealous
advocacy; both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility absolutely prohibit attor-
neys from knowingly making false statements of fact or law.1 93 In
some cases, failure to make a disclosure may constitute an affirmative
misrepresentation. 194
Ethical standards emphasize prosecutors' special responsibilities
but note relatively few specific duties, leading some scholars to ques-
tion whether existing ethical codes sufficiently define the constraints
imposed by prosecutors' dual obligations.195 For example, ethics pre-
vent prosecutors from instituting or allowing the continuing pendancy
of unsupported criminal charges 1 96 and require them to consider the
public interest and the interests of justice in determining whether to
file otherwise valid charges. 197 Furthermore, prosecutors must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the accused have been advised of their
186. See Rice, 505 N.E.2d at 619 (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibility
EC 7-13; Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.1 (1992)).
187. 882 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1989).
188. See id. at 199 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
189. See id. (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 198 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
191. See Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility DR-7-103(B) cmt. (1979)
("It appears possible, therefore, that a prosecutor may comply with the constitutional
standards set forth in Brady and Agurs and still be in violation of DR 7-103(B).").
192. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A) (1980); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 & cmts. 1, 2 (1998).
193. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(5); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a)(1).
194. See Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 3.3 cmt. 2. The Rules do
not indicate in which situations this occurs.
195. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 180, at 215 (challenging the adequacy of the
Model Code, Model Rules, and Standards).
196. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(A); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(a); Standards Relating to the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice Standard 3-3.9(a) (1992).
197. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13(2); Standards Relat-
ing to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9(b).
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right to counsel and have had the opportunity to obtain counsel.198
Ethics codes also incorporate the Brady v. Maryland obligation to
make timely disclosure to defendants of the existence of exculpatory
evidence. 199
The codes reflect a belief that the prosecution, because of its power,
access, and dual duties, must satisfy an elevated standard of fairness
and honesty. 0 The government must exercise its monopoly on the
legitimate use of coercive force in a manner which does not sacrifice
fairness on an individual level. Ethical codes, however, leave many
exercises of prosecutorial power unregulated and unrestrained. They
do little to resolve the ambiguity remaining within Brady doctrine re-
garding prosecutorial responsibility for preplea disclosure."' Com-
mentators have described the remaining vagueness as "striking,"2'
particularly because plea bargaining has emerged as the most frequent
process of arriving at dispositions of criminal cases.203 Rather than
operating under an "undefined obligation to 'do justice,"'"z prosecu-
tors conducting this process require specific ethical guidance. Part III
proposes that the ethical rules be amended to address this concern.
III. A PROPOSAL TO ADD A DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION
As the law and ethics governing prosecutors reflect, the fundamen-
tal value of justice in the enforcement of criminal law urges greater
protection for defendants confronting a state actor with superior
knowledge and bargaining power. The principle of fairness underly-
ing civil negotiation and contract formation suggests that information
exchange is essential to a defendant's informed decision to waive
rights. A defendant's evaluation of the government's case may be
critical to his or her decision to plead guilty; a defendant may waive
the right to trial based on such an assessment without admitting his or
her guilt 05 The importance of honesty and candor to the regulation
of the legal profession also supports proposals requiring openness of
198. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(b). Note that Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), already requires law enforcement to protect these
rights.
199. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(B); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d).
200. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. 1; Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standards 3-1.2(b), (c).
201. See McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1024-25.
202. Id at 958.
203. See id; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to "Guilty". Plea Bargain-
ing as Negotiation, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 115, 116-17 & n.7 (1997) (citing stud-
ies estimating that approximately 90% of criminal cases in the United States end in
guilty pleas); Lynch, supra note 83, at 2124 (describing the trial system as -largely
vestigial").
204. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 Win. & Mary L Rev. 1121,
1123 (1998).
205. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1969).
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prosecutors and other attorneys. The function of the criminal justice
system in society and the role of plea bargaining, however, argue
against an absolute rule mandating disclosure of all information. A
new disclosure obligation must therefore reconcile the goals of pro-
tecting the integrity of the profession, securing the bargaining rights of
defendants, and permitting the effective punishment and prevention
of crime.
A. Support for an Additional Duty
The lack of consensus regarding nonevidentiary disclosure indicates
the necessity of ethical guidance, particularly in light of the variety of
pressures influencing prosecutors' decisions.206 Furthermore, the
prevalence of plea negotiation as a means of case disposition20 7 sug-
gests that the standards of the practice should be brought into accord-
ance with courtroom conduct.
1. Professional Responsibility
Arguments for further ethical disclosure obligations derive from
two sources: the value of honor in the legal profession and concern
for the integrity of the criminal justice system. If attorneys do not
conduct themselves honorably, arguments for self-regulation will lose
their meaning. Moreover, augmenting lawyers' confidence in each
other will facilitate negotiation. Furthermore, legal ethics must pro-
mote our criminal justice system's promises of fairness to defendants
and justice of convictions.
Morality, responsibility to the profession, and maintenance of inde-
pendence weigh in favor of holding attorneys to a standard of honesty
in practice. Maintaining silence in order to lead a party to a false con-
clusion is generally considered misleading or dishonest conduct.20,
Cicero, tracing the historical requirement of honesty and good faith in
bargaining to the Roman Twelve Tables, distilled these guiding princi-
ples: "[T]hat I be not deceived and defrauded because of you and
because of trust in you.... [and that] between honest men there must
be honest dealing and no deception. ' 2 9 Permitting such misdirection
among attorneys is inconsistent with the bar's aspiration to truthful
and honorable conduct.
As commentators and the drafters of ethical rules argue, attorneys'
and the public's confidence in the values of legal practitioners is essen-
206. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 203.
208. See, e.g., Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 58 (Paul Roche trans., Bolchazy-Car-
ducci 1990) (condemning "disguise" as well as false statements); 2 Nehama Leibowitz,
Studies in Shemot (Exodus) 445 (Aryeh Newman trans., The World Zionist Organiza-
tion 1981) (discussing Biblical and Talmudic prohibitions against dishonesty).
209. Cicero, supra note 75, at 185.
3028 [Vol. 67
NONEVIDENTIARY INFORMATION
tial in a society premised upon the rule of law.210 As members of a
selective profession, lawyers should hold each other to a heightened
standard of conduct.211 Without a coherent code of ethics, attorneys
would be nothing more than "hired guns," and the legal system would
reward duplicitous behavior. Ethical rules allow lawyers, to a reason-
able extent, to trust one another, facilitating productive negotiation
and efficient use of time and resources.
Furthermore, the independence of the bar, while necessary to pro-
tect liberty,2 12 must be legitimized by its members' adherence to rules
of honorable conduct.213 Lawyers serve society's interest in justice;
the legal system is a means to the just resolution of disputes and the
protection of rights. This is inconsistent with the use of legal training
to exploit unfair advantages, conceal dishonesty, or obtain uncon-
scionable results. Prosecutors, as other lawyers, therefore owe society
a duty to deal with defendants in good faith.
A prosecutor's silence can be particularly misleading in the context
of his or her prior statements and actions. Arrest, arraignment, or
indictment may appear as a prosecutor's assertion that the govern-
ment has a strong enough case to win at trial. Alternatively, a prose-
cutor may describe the government's evidence to a defendant in a
pretrial conference, or answer in the negative when asked if the gov-
ernment knows of a witness who would contradict the defendant's al-
ibi. Although the prosecutor may make these statements or
representations honestly and truthfully, a defendant may construe his
or her subsequent silence regarding these points as signifying that the
status of the government's case has remained unchanged. A prosecu-
tor's duty to disabuse a defendant of a misapprehension of the facts
will depend upon the prosecutor's role in creating the
misconception.214
2. The Integrity of the Criminal Justice System
As the agents who implement the government's coercive power,
prosecutors owe a further duty to ensure the delivery of justice.2 1 5 So-
ciety is entitled to convictions that it believes are just, and individuals
are entitled to fairness within the system.216 Due process jurispru-
dence217 and special ethical regulation of prosecutorial conduct218 re-
210. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. (1998); Freedman, supra note
180, at 2.
211. See Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 589.
212. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
213. See Rubin, Causerie, supra note 19, at 588-89.
214. See infra Part III.C.
215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See Arenella, supra note 88, at 202 (discussing the public legitimation function
of the criminal justice system); supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part II.A, B.2.
218. See supra Part II.C.
1999] 3029
3030 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
flect a desire to restrain the power of government. The pursuit of
justice therefore balances the goals of punishing and preventing anti-
social behavior against respect for individual rights. 2
19
The doctrine of Brady v. Maryland220 protects a criminal defend-
ant's right to information tending to disprove his or her guilt in order
to imbue criminal adjudication with the fundamental fairness guaran-
teed by the DueProcess Clause. The government's superior investiga-
tive resources are essential to effective law enforcement, but must not
lend the prosecution an unfair advantage.22 ' The distinctions between
evidentiary and non-evidentiary information, and between exculpa-
tory and non-exculpatory material, do not change the fact that a pros-
ecutor obtains information, to which a defendant likely has no access,
by virtue of the superior power of government. The information is
material to a defendant's decision-making process; the result of the
hypothetical plea negotiation, for example, would be affected by the
defendant's knowledge of the relative weakness of the government's
case.2 22 The absence of a witness will not affirmatively exculpate a
defendant, but it will shape that defendant's analysis and decision to
waive his or her rights.
Furthermore, convicting guilty defendants is not the only function
of criminal procedure law; fair treatment of the accused lies at the
core of due process.2 Equitable treatment is as vital to justice in plea
agreements as it is to justice in convictions at trial. A prosecutor's
misdirection or withholding of information in order to affect a defend-
ant's tactical calculations at trial or in plea negotiation exploits the
government's superior power. Because negotiation between a prose-
cutor and a defendant assumes good faith,224 a defendant's misappre-
hension of the case against him or her, even when not the result of a
prosecutor's deliberate action, unfairly leads the defendant to make a
miscalculated decision.
The emergence of plea negotiation as the most common procedure
of case disposition demands greater regulation. Some commentators
suggest that plea bargaining has evolved into a "de facto administra-
tive process ' 225 by which prosecutors adjudicate guilt and determine
punishment. Although the "best" prosecutors' offices instill a sense of
fairness in their attorneys, there is little oversight of plea bargaining in
these or other offices.226 The plea process occurs outside the presence
of a judge, and the court does not engage in extensive investigation of
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
221. See supra Part II.
222. See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part II.A, B.2.
224. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
225. Lynch, supra note 83, at 2144.
226. See id. at 2149.
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the facts of a case when parties enter a plea agreement.227 The vast
majority of cases are therefore disposed of without judicial participa-
tion or strict regulation.
The absence of formal regulation of plea negotiation is a result of
society's ideological refusal to acknowledge prosecutors' de facto ad-
judicative role."18 The extension of the Brady v. Maryland rule to plea
agreements" 9 may indicate a recognition of the prosecutor's essential
assumption of the role of fact-finder in the plea process. While this
extension represents progress toward adequate regulation, it still
leaves significant areas of prosecutorial tactics outside the scope of
both judicial purview and professional ethics. As plea bargaining es-
sentially replaces trials in most cases," 0 a defendant's right to know
the strength of the case against him or her, including what the prose-
cutor will actually be able to present in the event of a trial, becomes
increasingly important.
Adding a disclosure obligation would also promote the goal of jus-
tice by reducing the extent to which defendants' bargaining power
varies with the quality of their representation." 1 An overworked or
inexperienced defense counsel will likely overlook the need to con-
stantly inquire whether each of a prosecutor's statements remains ac-
curate. Asking, for example, whether an eyewitness is still alive prior
to accepting a plea offer is not a uniform practice even among sea-
soned attorneys. 2  Furthermore, defense attorneys often have an in-
terest in saving time by encouraging their clients to plead guilty and
may prematurely advise their clients to accept offers." 3 Requiring
prosecutors to disclose certain nonevidentiary information, particu-
larly when a prosecutor's prior statement has become inaccurate due
to changed circumstances, would facilitate defendants' personal stra-
tegic choices.
The variety of institutional and political pressures motivating prose-
cutors' behavior," 4 and disagreement among prosecutors as to where
to draw lines of proprietY" 5 present further arguments in favor of ad-
ding an ethical duty. Binding all prosecutors to the same course of
227. See Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 Yale
LJ. 1581, 1601 (1981).
228. See Lynch, supra note 83, at 2124.
229. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 203.
231. See Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1587-88.
232. Interview with Defense Counsel "A." See supra note 16. Defense Counsel
"A" is a former prosecutor who is unaware of any colleagues who make such inquiry
of prosecutors.
233. See Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1588.
234. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
235. See McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bhtffing, supra note 16, at 3 (describing the
lack of consensus among prosecutors regarding the extent to which a prosecutor may
pretend his or her case is stronger than it is during plea negotiations).
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action guarantees each that a morally honest course of action will not
cause damage to their careers.
3. Principles of Negotiation and Contract Law
The fairness and bargaining principles of contract law236 have some
application within the criminal context. While plea negotiations will
invariably involve duress as a result of the government's exertion of
coercive force, greater prosecutorial disclosure can mitigate the effects
of duress as well as unilateral mistake upon a defendant's decision.237
While plea bargains are not perfectly analogous to contract negotia-
tions, the two systems bear several similarities. Modifying plea bar-
gaining practice may instill it with a similar value of fairness, while still
appropriate to criminal justice, to that found in the law and ethics of
contracts.
Several common characteristics suggest that civil negotiation and
contract theory can apply to plea bargaining.3 8 First, courts fre-
quently approach a plea agreement as a settlement contract. 239 Simi-
lar to civil parties, the prosecutor and the defendant each evaluate the
strength of their cases and the potential outcome at trial.240 Proce-
dural rights, the strength of evidence, factual innocence or guilt, and
possible punishment all inform the parties' estimates.24 Similar to
civil parties, each party to a plea negotiation acts upon all available
information to assess his or her case and accordingly establish goals
and limits for the negotiation.242 Availability of information is there-
fore essential to the effectiveness of this process.
A second similarity between attorneys negotiating in the civil and
criminal contexts is the variety of principles' and agents' motiva-
tions.243 Conflicting incentives may bar agreements even when a
mutually acceptable solution exists. Prosecutors may be dispropor-
tionately subject to these inconsistencies. Primarily, prosecutors must
pursue the goals of increasing public safety and reducing crime.244
They must also consider public perception of plea agreements, which
may appear too lenient, too harsh, too frequent, or too rare.245 Fur-
thermore, loyalty or a sense of obligation to law enforcement agencies
236. See supra Part I.D.
237. See Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1609-10.
238. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 203, at 147.
239. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Rubin, Causerie, supra
note 19, at 587.
240. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 50, 59-61 (1968).
241. See William F. McDonald, Plea Bargaining: Critical Issues and Common Prac-
tices 63-70 (1985) [hereinafter McDonald, Critical Issues].
242. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 768-69.
243. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 203, at 126; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1987-88 (1992).
244. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 203, at 130.
245. See id. at 131.
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or agents may induce prosecutors either to ensure a conviction by ac-
cepting a plea or to seek the maximum penalty by bringing a case to
trial.246 In addition, crime victims' desires can influence prosecutors
in either direction.2 4 7 Many prosecutors also act with the goal of pro-
moting the ideals of justice and morality, thereby dissuading them
from accepting a plea that carries an insufficient sentence.24 s More-
over, institutional pressures such as supervisors' goals and prefer-
ences, as well as the electorate's demand for high conviction rates and
reduced spending levels, exert significant influence over prosecutors'
decisions.24 9 All of these forces may align against the value of dealing
fairly with a defendant and thereby risking a trial or reduced plea
agreement. In the absence of an affirmative disclosure duty, these
forces will likely prevail.
A third analogy between the civil and criminal negotiation systems
is the effect that trust among advocates exerts on the bargaining pro-
cess. Informal cooperative relationships increase the efficiency of plea
bargaining and facilitate some bilateral information exchange.' s The
quality of relationships may also have an impact upon the final plea;
attorneys' attitudes toward dealing with each other affect the extent to
which they will listen to each other and credit what the other
presents.251
Moreover, arguments appealing to fairness in negotiation should
sound at least as strongly in the criminal context. The validity of civil
settlements relies upon the informed consent of the parties. Ideally, a
criminal defendant who waives constitutional rights will also do so de-
liberately and meaningfully. Furthermore, prosecutors bear the same
professional responsibilities as civil attorneys, as well as the additional
duty to act in the interest of justice.
Applying the principles of the bargaining model can buttress the
fairness, and therefore the integrity, of the practice of law in general
and the criminal justice system in particular. The importance of good
faith in the criminal justice system is reflected in both the due process
concern for fundamental faimess s2 and the prosecutor's ethical duty
to seek justice.5 3 Fairness is a basic precept in the law of negotiation
and contract as well;254 the requirement of informed consent balances
the advantages of each bargaining party. A negotiation or contract
model of extrajudicial interaction among parties to a criminal case
246. See McDonald, Critical Issues, supra note 241, at 69.
247. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 203, at 132-33.
248. See id at 133.
249. See Schulhofer, supra note 243, at 1987; Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1586.
250. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 203, at 135-36.
251. See id at 137-45 (citing empirical examples).
252. See supra Part II.B.2.
253. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part I.D.
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suggests that disclosure in criminal law, as in civil proceedings, can
increase the level of fairness to defendants.
Similar to contracting parties, each side in a plea agreement makes
concessions or promises performance in exchange for consideration.
A defendant waives his or her constitutional rights to a jury trial, to
confront his or her accusers, and against self-incrimination 255 in ex-
change for a prosecutor's enforceable promises.256 The defendant's
consent to this bargain may be more significant than his or her confes-
sion to a crime; a court may accept a guilty plea when the defendant
denies criminal responsibility but waives his or her rights voluntarily
and intelligently.25 7 Both the prosecutor and the defendant determine
whether to enter into a plea agreement, and what terms they will ac-
cept, based upon their assessments of the likelihood of conviction at
trial and probable sentence. 8 A defendant must have a "meaningful
opportunity to make a rational prediction ' 259 in order to make a vol-
untary and intelligent decision to waive his or her fundamental rights.
A disclosure duty would ensure that the power of the prosecutor
and the influence of defense counsel do not limit this "meaningful op-
portunity." It would allow a defendant to personally assess the risks
of trial and to bargain for adequate consideration in return for his or
her waiver.260 It would also mitigate the duress inherent in the de-
fendant's position. In contract law, a party who enters into an agree-
ment in response to a threat may void the transaction. 61 While the
threat of coercive force is inherent in the enforcement of criminal law,
a prosecutor's overrepresentation of the strength of the government's
case increases the pressure on the defendant to accept an unfavorable
bargain. 62
255. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
256. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (holding that either
prosecution must honor promise offered as incentive to plea or defendant must be
allowed to withdraw plea).
257. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-38 (1970).
258. See Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1605.
259. Id. (citing Nagel and Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium
Models: Part 11, 52 Ind. L.J. 1, 43-44 (1976).
260. See id. at 1608-09.
261. See Charles L. Knapp & Nathan M. Crystal, Problems in Contract Law: Cases
and Materials 601 (3d ed. 1993). Contract law offers a remedy for duress, or a
"wrongful threat which overcomes the free will of a party." John D. Calamari and
Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 308-09 (4th ed. 1998). A party who has
entered into a contract as a result of such duress may void the contract. See id. at 320.
A party who has entered into a contract because of economic duress, and who has no
reasonable alternative to accepting the contract, such as a trial, may also elect to void
the contract. See id. at 309, 320.
262. See Ostrow, supra note 227, at 1609.
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B. Arguments in Favor of Restricting the New Duty
The purposes of criminal law are to avenge antisocial acts, to reduce
crime by isolating perpetrators of criminal activity, and to discourage
others from engaging in similar behavior.263 As the criminal proce-
dure law illustrates, defendants must receive a fair opportunity to de-
fend themselves. 2' The government must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt265 and may not conceal evidence which could sup-
port a defendant's case.26 This does not, however, require prosecu-
tors to open their entire files to criminal defendants. Limitations
upon prosecutors' disclosure duties allow the government to effec-
tively achieve the goals of criminal justice.267
Civil and criminal negotiation bear significant distinctions as a re-
sult of their different purposes. Unlike civil cases, the criminal justice
system is not designed to maximize each party's benefit. Further-
more, while parties in both processes assess their preferences and
likely outcomes at trial,268 the criminal justice system imposes limita-
tions on the bargaining process. First, the civil settlement model as-
sumes that both parties have equal access to information, whereas
discovery is limited in plea bargaining.269 Second, in contrast to civil
parties' ability to settle upon any agreement or dollar amount, a pros-
ecutor and a defendant must generally concur on either innocence or
conviction of some offense.270 Statutes may restrict the range of of-
fenses to which an indicted defendant may plead.2 71 Furthermore,
even a plea to a reduced charge will result in stigma and the risk of
incarceration or other penal sanction.27 Third, the factors the parties
to plea bargaining weigh in deciding whether to accept an offer are
less easily quantifiable than the generally pecuniary goals of civil liti-
gants; a prosecutor seeks to satisfy societal desires for revenge, deter-
rence, and fairness while a defendant acts to reduce jail time, social
stigma, and collateral damage to his or her personal life. 2"3 Finally,
the coercive power of the prosecutor and the general disequilibrium
263. See supra Part II.A.
264. See supra Part II.B.
265. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (tracing the "reasonable doubt"
standard to the late eighteenth century).
266. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. See supra Part II.B.1.
268. See Zacharias, supra note 204, at 1129.
269. See id at 1129-31. Professor Zacharias adds that in practice, the two systems
may be more similar. See id. at 1131 n.27 (describing information asymmetries in civil
litigation, which results in parties settling cases prior to full factual disclosure).
270. See id. at 1132; McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1026.
271. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.10(5) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(establishing limits upon classes of felonies to which defendants may plead guilty).
272. See McMunigal, supra note 11, at 1026; Zacharias, supra note 204, at 1132.
273. See Zacharias, supra note 204, at 1132.
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between the government and the defendant challenge the assertion
that a plea bargain is a voluntary agreement or contract.2 74
Furthermore, as discussed above,2 75 the purposes of the criminal
and civil justice systems are different. The civil system is oriented to-
ward efficient resolution of disputes among private parties.2 76 In con-
trast, criminal law implements the coercive power of the
government.2 77 Efficiency of case disposition is an important, but not
paramount, concern. Criminal justice satisfies society's desire for re-
venge upon those who engage in antisocial behavior and imposes dis-
incentives against committing harmful acts.2 78 Fairness to defendants
is essential, but effective ex post punishment and ex ante discourage-
ment of criminal activity are necessary to an orderly society of law. 79
The government must remain capable of enforcing the law within the
bounds of consistency, accuracy, and due process.
Permitting nondisclosure does not necessarily constitute condoning
dishonesty. A prosecutor's honest representation that he or she has a
case that could succeed at trial frequently remains valid in the scena-
rio of a missing or unwilling witness.280 The results of trials are never
certain or predictable; "an innocent individual can be successfully
prosecuted even with quite flimsy evidence[,] . .. [while] there is no
such thing as a truly dead-bang case. '281 The initiation of a prosecu-
tion therefore does not indicate a prosecutor's precise calculation of a
specific likelihood of conviction.8 2 As long as a prosecutor's state-
ments and responses to questions are true and timely, there is no
breach of honesty.
Furthermore, requiring extensive disclosure of nonevidentiary,
nonexculpatory information would subvert the purpose of criminal
procedure. The Criminal Rules reflect a policy which protects the
criminal justice system from witness tampering and successful per-
jury."' While a defendant has a constitutional right to testify,2 84 there
274. See id. at 1133-34.
275. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
276. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
277. See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 97 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan David-
son 1947) (1859) ("It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take pre-
cautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it
afterwards.").
278. See, e.g., John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 272 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing purpose of punishment under law);
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
279. See Seidman, Utilitarian Theory, supra note 89, at 337; The Federalist, supra
note 23, No. 15, at 149, No. 80, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton); Letter from George
Washington to John Jay (Aug. 1, 1786), reprinted in 2 Great Issues in American His-
tory, supra note 87, at 82.
280. See McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing, supra note 16, at 7.
281. Id.
282. See id. (describing prosecutors' knowledge that "there are no cases with a zero
probability of conviction" and "[t]here is nothing certain").
283. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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is no right to testify falsely.' The disclosure of witnesses who could
expose the defendant's dishonesty only becomes an issue if a defend-
ant intends to lie. Facilitating calculated decisions of whether to com-
mit or suborn perjury would be inconsistent with basic principles of
the legal system." 6
Moreover, automatically revealing the death, disappearance, or
non-cooperation of a witness could allow a factually guilty defendant
to escape full punishment simply because of chance. Unlike Brady v.
Maryland'-7 and other doctrines which courts apply to ensure the ac-
curacy of convictions and pleas, this type of disclosure would most
likely produce results inconsistent with the facts of a crime. As the
Jones court emphasized, "a fundamental concern of the criminal jus-
tice system, of course, is that an innocent defendant shall not be con-
victed; not that a possibly guilty actor shall escape conviction because
the People are not able to establish his guilt."8 The obligations that
courts impose upon prosecutors in the interest of fairness provide a
defendant with a full opportunity to argue his or her innocence. They
do not serve to provide the defendant with advantages beyond full
knowledge of the procedural integrity of the case against him or her
and evidence which he or she may use as a defense.
While the contract principles of full disclosure and candor are admi-
rable in that context, the civil negotiation model is not a perfect anal-
ogy to the criminal justice system. Criminal justice is not designed to
maximize the benefit of each party; it serves to implement society's
rules of conduct. 89 This implementation can be fair without requiring
full disclosure of the prosecution's case. The goal of the system is to
achieve convictions which are just and accurate,z2° and the disclosure
owed to defendants under current obligations promotes this goal.
Furthermore, a defendant does not voluntarily engage in plea negotia-
tions; the government has already brought its coercive force to bear
upon him or her. This further indicates that the intent of the system is
not to advance the interests of the defendant, but rather to promote
the government's interest within the bounds of the law.
C. Proposal
Two lines of analysis suggest that an additional duty to disclose
would contribute to the fairness of the criminal justice system and to
284. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,51-53 (1987) (finding a fundamental consti-
tutional right of a criminal defendant to testify implicit in the Fifth, Sixth, and Four-
teenth Amendments); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961) (describing
history of criminal defendants' right to testify).
285. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
286. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
287. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
288. People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44 (N.Y. 1978).
289. See supra Part II.A, B.2.
290. See supra Part II.B.2.
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the integrity of legal ethics. One, based upon contract and negotiation
practice, emphasizes the importance of information to parties who
make calculated sacrifices in exchange for benefits.2 9' The other,
based upon the value of justice in criminal law, draws from the spirit
of due process jurisprudence"92 and the prosecutor's unique role as an
advocate for just results.2 93 Furthermore, the arguments reinforce
each other; if all attorneys should undertake to achieve fairness to
both sides in contracts and negotiations, then prosecutors' special duty
should hold them to at least as high a standard.294
Considered alone, this model would support a broad duty for prose-
cutors to disclose all information which could influence a defendant's
strategic decisions. The case for an additional obligation, however,
must be tempered by the concerns and goals of the criminal justice
system. The system identifies and punishes the guilty.2 95 Whereas
many disclosure obligations refine the truth-secking function of crimi-
nal justice, 96 this new obligation could prevent accurate results. The
proposal must therefore ensure the honor of prosecutorial conduct
while preserving the legitimate power of the criminal justice system.
The standard should impose an affirmative duty upon a prosecutor to
correct a defendant's assessment of his or her case when the prosecu-
tor's prior statements or omissions, although accurate when made, no
longer reflect the facts. This obligation would allow prosecutors to
continue to engage in the same tactical and strategic practices that
they currently employ at the outset of a case. It would simply prevent
them from allowing a situation which they may not create at the com-
mencement of a prosecution to develop during the pendancy of an
action.
An ethical rule to enforce such an obligation could, for example,
require that:
1. Prosecutors shall correct any statement or representation of fact
made by them, or by their office, to a defendant, when such state-
ment or representation, although accurate when made, has be-
come inaccurate due to factors exclusively within the prosecutor's
means of intelligence or not reasonably discoverable by the
defendant.
2. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to require a prosecutor to
disclose to a defendant that the defendant's intended fraud upon
the court has been discovered or can be rebutted.
291. See supra Part III.A.3.
292. See supra Part II.B.2.
293. See supra Part II.B.2, C.
294. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part II.A.
296. See supra Part IH.B.2.
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Part 1 of the rule satisfies the value of fair dealing discussed in this
Note, combining the values in Laidlaiv and the Restatement 297 with
the limitations imposed by the interests of the criminal justice sys-
tem.298 Part 2 prevents the rule from creating an incentive for a de-
fendant to present false testimony or evidence; a defendant's
knowledge of a requirement for a prosecutor to warn him that such a
deception would not succeed would likely encourage attempts at per-
jury. Furthermore, catching a defendant or witness in a lie is sufficient
to impeach his or her credibility and a prosecutor should be permitted
to expose a defendant's or witness's dishonesty.
Although it is difficult to argue in favor of a rule which would fur-
ther impede prosecutors in their pursuit of convicting substantively
guilty defendants, such measures have been deemed legally or ethi-
cally necessary in the past.299 Adding to prosecutors' duties would
undoubtedly cause more cases to proceed to trial. A greater duty
would also likely result in a greater number of factually guilty defend-
ants remaining unconvicted, a consequence also incurred by doctrines
such as the exclusionary rule, the Jencks Act,3" and Brady v. Mary-
land.30 1 In contrast to these precedents and subsequent proposals to
apply their analyses to plea bargaining, however, the duty proposed in
this Note would do little to ensure the accuracy of plea or trial results.
It would primarily protect a defendant's right to make an informed
decision and consistently regulate attorney conduct.
CONCLUSION
The positive effects of additional ethical duties can outweigh the
hardship they impose upon the administration of criminal justice. In
the small-scale analysis, by universally mandating a single course of
action, ethical rules assure each prosecutor that he or she engages in
the same course of conduct as his or her peers. Uniformity relieves
each individual of the need to reconcile an uncertain moral and ethical
dilemma which may pit honesty and honor against zealousness and
professional competition. Similarly, permitting prosecutors to with-
hold decision-influencing information allows the voting public's de-
mand for convictions to reward morally marginal conduct; requiring
prosecutors to disclose such information liberates a prosecutor's office
from public pressure. On a greater scale, adding a duty can fill a logi-
cal gap in existing ethical standards, thereby contributing to the integ-
rity, coherence, and consistency of both professional legal ethics and
the criminal justice system. This lends greater legitimacy to both of
297. See supra Part I.D.
298. See supra Part II.
299. See supra Part II.B.2.
300. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994); see supra note 121.
301. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see supra Part II.B.2.
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the self-regulating tradition of the legal profession and the trial and
plea bargaining processes.
Accuracy of results is not the only rationale for imposing obliga-
tions upon prosecutors; as attorneys and agents of the government,
they are responsible for just and honorable conduct. The general legal
community's rejection of fairness as a requirement, which has un-
doubtedly contributed to the negative popular image of lawyers, does
not indicate that such a standard would be inappropriate for prosecu-
tors. Prosecutors are bound to standards beyond those of other attor-
neys based upon an obligation to seek justice. This duty is an essential
counterweight to the government's superior investigative and coercive
power; society's right to legitimate convictions and a defendant's
rights to fair treatment demand it. In the interests of honor and jus-
tice, a prosecutor should not allow a defendant's misapprehensions to
remain uncorrected when the prosecutor has contributed, directly or
indirectly, to that misperception. Even though the prosecutor never
lied, he or she made statements upon which a defendant must base a
fundamental and personal decision. The defendant, lacking the supe-
rior resources of the government, is entitled to a prosecutor's assur-
ance that his or her representations remain accurate, when such is the
case, or to disclosure of new facts when the prior representations have
become misleading. Moreover, society is entitled to a high standard
of ethical behavior by prosecutors, to whom it entrusts the coercive
power of the state, and by attorneys in general, upon whom it confers
the privilege of self-government.
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